The word apory stems from the Greek aporia, meaning impasse or perplexing difficulty. In _Aporetics,_ Nicholas Rescher defines an apory as a group of individually plausible but collectively incompatible theses. Rescher examines historic, formulaic, and systematic apories and couples these with aporetic theory from other authors to form this original and comprehensive survey. Citing thinkers from the pre-Socratics through Spinoza, Hegel, and Nicolai Hartmann, he builds a framework for coping with the complexities of divergent theses, and shows (...) in detail how aporetic analysis can be applied to a variety of fields including philosophy, mathematics, linguistics, logic, and intellectual history. Rescher's in-depth examination reveals how aporetic inconsistency can be managed through a plausibility analysis that breaks the chain of inconsistency at its weakest link by deploying right-of-way precedence based on considerations of cognitive centrality. Thus while involvement with cognitive conflicts and inconsistencies are pervasive in human thought, aporetic analysis can provide an effective means of damage control. (shrink)

In theory and practice, the notion of fairness is far from simple. The principle is often elusive and subject to confusion, even in institutions of law, usage, and custom. In Fairness, Nicholas Rescher aims to liberate this concept from misunderstandings by showing how its definitive characteristics prevent it from being absorbed by such related conceptions as paternalistic benevolence, radical egalitarianism, and social harmonization. Rescher demonstrates that equality before the state is an instrument of justice, not of social (...) utility or public welfare, and argues that the notion of fairness stops well short of a literal egalitarianism. Rescher disposes of the confusions arising from economists' penchant to focus on individual preferences, from decision theorists' concern for averting envy, and from political theorists' sympathy for egalitarianism. In their place he shows how the idea of distributive equity forms the core of the concept of fairness in matters of distributive justice. The coordination of shares with valid claims is the crux of the concept of fairness. In Rescher's view, this means that the pursuit of fairness requires objective rather than subjective evaluation of the goods being shared. This is something quite different from subjective equity based on the personal evaluation of goods by those laying claim to them. Insofar as subjective equity is a concern, the appropriate procedure for its realization is a process of maximum value distribution. Further, Rescher demonstrates that in matters of distributive justice, the distinction between new ownership and preexisting ownership is pivotal and calls for proceeding on very different principles depending on the case. How one should proceed depends on context, and what is adjudged fair is pragmatic, in that there are different requirements for effectiveness in achieving the aims and purposes of the sort of distribution that is intended. Rescher concludes that fairness is a fundamentally ethical concept. Its distinctive modus operandi contrasts sharply with the aims of paternalism, preference-maximizing, or economic advantage. Fairness will be of interest to philosophers, economists, and political scientists. "[Fairness is] one of the most forceful conceptual analysis of fairness yet produced." -Ludwig Beckman, The Review of Metaphysics Nicholas Rescher is University Professor of Philosophy and vice chairman of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He has written more than seventy books in various areas of philosophy, including Complexity: A Philosophical Overview and Inquiry Dynamics, both published by Transaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:New Light from Arabic Sources on Galen and the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism NICHOLAS RESCHER The Problem of the Origin of the Fourth Figure FLYING IN THE FACE of the long-standing tradition--going back in Europe to Renaissance times--which credits Galen of Pergamon with the origination of the fourth syllogistic figure, recent authorities have almost to a man evinced doubt about Galen's claim to this innovation. Heinrieh (...) Scholz speaks of "the Galenian syllogistic figure which has been attributed to him, probably wrongly." i j. W. Stakelum concludes his careful discussion of the matter with the categorical assertion that "Galen did not teach the fourth figure." ~ I. M. Bochenski--following Lukasiewicz (see below)--says that the fourth figure "was only ascribed to Galen by a misunderstanding." : William Kneale (also following Lukasiewicz) writes that "it is easy to see how misunderstanding.., by some Arabian philosopher... could have given rise to the tradition that Galen added a fourth figure to Aristotle's syllogistic theory." 4 The currently received account of the matter is that of Jan Lukasiewicz who, in his book on Aristotle's Syllogistic (1951; 2d ed., 1957), presents the known reports about Galen and the fourth figure as follows (I list them in the order in which they came to light) : 1) Several passages in Averroes' (d. 1198) Middle Commentary on Prior Analytics credit Galen with introducing a fourth figure (ad Anal. Pr. I, 5; I, 8; I, 23). These passages, known in Europe through a Renaissance Latin translation of a Hebrew version, provided the basis upon which Zabarella in his work, De Quarta Syllogismorum Figura (in his Opera [Leiden: 1587], pp. 41-53), popularized the "Galenian figure" in European logic. 2) In 1844 Minoides Mynas published in the Preface to his edition of Galen's EisagSg~ dialektik~ an anonymous Greek fragment (late, perhaps 6th century) which states that certain "later scholars" transformed the indirect moods of the first figure added by Theophrastus and Eudeffms into a new fourth figure, citing Galen as the originator of this doctrine.~ 1Abriss der Geschichte der Logik (Miinster: 1931), trans, into English by K. F. Leidecker, ConciseHistory of Logic (NewYork: 1961);p. 38ofthe Englishversion. "Why 'Galenian' Figure?" The New Scholasticism, XVI (1942),289-296. s Formale Logik (Miinchen-Freiburg:1956; 2nd. ed., 1962), trans, into English by Ivo Thomas, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame: 1961);p. 142of the Englishversion. Williamand Martha Kneale, The Developmentof Logic (Oxford: 1962),p. 184. Alsoprinted in Karl Kalbfieisch, ~ber Galen s Einleitung in die Logik, 2~. Supplementband der Jahrbi~cherfi~r klassische Philologie (Leipzig:1897), p. 707. This datum casts some 28 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3) A Greek fragment was found around 1858 by Karl Prantl in a logical work of the Byzantine scholar Ioannes Italus (llth century) which says that Galen taught the existence of a fourth figure, adding sarcastically that he (Galen) thought thus to appear cleverer than the older logical commentators (presumably Theophrastus and Eudemus are intended), but fell far short.6 4) In 1899 Maximilian Wallies published7 an anonymous Greek scholium (of perhaps the 6th or the 7th century) on Ammonins' commentary on Prior Analytics which states that Galen "says in his Apodictic that there are four figures, because he looks at the compound syllogisms consisting of four terms (i.e., with three premisses )" rather than the simple (three-term, two-premiss) syllogisms of Aristotle. (The scholiast goes on to explain at some length how such compound syllogisms can be sorted into four groups.) It is readily seen that, given these data, two possibilities stand before us: a) Galen did actually invent the traditional fourth figure. Reports (1)-(3) are correct, and the anonymous scholiast of (4) was put on the wrong track by the fact that Galen also said that compound syllogisms of four terms can be classed into four groups. b) Galen did not invent the traditional fourth figure. Only after his time when once the indirect moods of the first figure had--somehow--become systematized into a separate "figure," was this credited to Galen by a mistake along the lines described by the anonymous scholiast. Thus (4) alone is right, and (1)-(3) are mistaken. Which of... (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology is the philosophical study of the conditions of human existence and the issues that confront people in the conduct of their everyday lives. This book surveys, from a contemplative, philosophical point of view, a wide variety of human-interest issues, including happiness, luck, aging, the meaning of life, optimism and pessimism, morality, and faith and belief. The author's deliberations blend historical, theoretical, and personal perspectives into philosophical appreciation of the human condition. The philosophers of Greek antiquity took philosophy to (...) center around just this issue of intelligent living - of determining the nature of life under the guidance of reason. Such a perspective puts philosophical agenda - a position it contested with the philosophy of nature throughout classical antiquity. In more recent times, however, its prominence has declined - no doubt, the author suggests, because modern man's achievements have been more notable in the natural than in the human science. (shrink)

This volume represents an update of the author's earlier autobiography, Mid-Journey . The addition of three chapters brings the author's life up to 1985. The original autobiography was written at the mid-point of Rescher's professional life as an endeavor in self-definition and self-comprehension. The book's story-line revolves around the author's finding himself in the career of a philosopher, but also details the story of his life.

Originally published in 1966. Professor Rescher's aim is to develop a "logic of commands" in exactly the same general way which standard logic has already developed a "logic of truth-functional statement compounds" or a "logic of quantifiers". The object is to present a tolerably accurate and precise account of the logically relevant facets of a command, to study the nature of "inference" in reasonings involving commands, and above all to establish a viable concept of validity in command inference, so (...) that the logical relationships among commands can be studied with something of the rigour to which one is accustomed in other branches of logic. (shrink)

VIRTUALLY ALL MODAL LOGICIANS after Aristotle have been troubled by his insistence that, given a valid first figure categorical syllogism.

PERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE of professional philosophy in North America at this historic juncture is its scope and scale. The historian Bruce Kuklick entitled his informative study of academic philosophy in the United States, The Rise of American Philosophy: 1860-1930, even though his book dealt only with the Department of Philosophy of Harvard University. This institution's prominence on the American philosophical scene in the early years of the century was such that this parochial-seeming narrowing of focus to one single (...) department--with its half-dozen or so philosophers--was not totally absurd for the period at issue. But today it would certainly be so. The American Philosophical Association, to which most United States academic practitioners of the discipline belong, presently has more than eight thousand members, and the comprehensive Directory of American Philosophers for 1992-1993 lists well over ten thousand philosophers affiliated to colleges and universities in the United States and Canada. Admittedly, this profession is small potatoes compared with other academic enterprises; the Scientific Research Society Sigma XI currently has a membership of more than one hundred thousand scientists, and the Modern Language Association has more than thirty-two thousand members. All the same, a small town of not inconsiderable size could be populated exclusively with contemporary North American academic philosophers. To be sure, its demographics would be rather unusual. Only just under twenty percent would be women; and blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans would constitute just over one percent of the population. The social classes above and below the middle are underrepresented in this community, and a disproportionate fraction of its members comes from families of professional status. Moreover, for reasons that require a deeper sociological analysis than can be attempted here, the profession attracts a disproportionately larger fraction of Catholics, Jews, and immigrants. (shrink)

The particular problem which will concern us here is raised by "Leibniz's Rule": Eadem sunt quorum unum in alterius locum substitui potest, salva veritate. The puzzle arises from the following inference.

This position is not confined to the philosophical pragmatists of yore. More recent methodologists of science have reacted to Rudolf Carnap’s thesis that science can dispense with accepting hypotheses as true by maintaining that scientists do accept hypotheses, albeit on practical rather than theoretical grounds. On the position adopted by this school of thought, "accepting a hypothesis as true" is to be reinterpreted to amount to "acting or being disposed to act in the manner which would be best relative to (...) a given objective." Accordingly, such theorists propose in effect to reconstrue acceptability-as-true in terms of successful action. (shrink)

The greatest of the Arabic philosophers was the Spanish Muslim Abu-l-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd = Averroes. In the midst of a busy public career, as court scholar and personal physician to an Almohad caliph, and as chief magistrate of Cordova, Ibn Rushd found time to compose a monumental series of philosophical commentaries, as well as several important legal, astronomical, and medical works. His extensive commentaries on Aristotle earned him St. Thomas's accolade of "The Commentator.".

HOW MUCH CAN A PERSON KNOW? A Leibnizian Perspective on Human Finitude. How much can someone possibly know? What could reasonably be viewed as an upper limit of an individual’s knowledge—supposing that factually informative knowledge rather than performative how-to knowledge or subliminally tacit knowledge is to be at issue?

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1987.

SUPPORTERS of a coherentist standard of truth must be able to establish that this criterion is duly consonant with the definitional nature of truth, for there ought rightfully to be a continuity between our evidential criterion of acceptability-as-true and the "truth" as definitionally specified. Any satisfactory criterion must be such as to yield the real thing--at any rate in sufficiently favorable circumstances. Fortunately for coherentism, it is possible to demonstrate rigorously that truth is tantamount to ideal coherence--that a proposition's being (...) true is in fact equivalent with its being optimally coherent with an ideal data base. Given that the preceding continuity requirement is satisfied, the traditional view of truth as accord with fact is thus also available to coherentists. However, the element of idealization at issue means that we cannot claim that coherence provides us with unqualified truth in actual practice. The coherence-based inquiries we actually carry out, can go only so far as to afford our best available estimate of the real truth. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * Introduction * Epistemic versus Practical Authority * Scientific Authority and Its Limits * The Validation for Acknowledging Authority * Ecclesiastical Authority * Which One? * Note * References * Further Reading.

Since the late 1960's Professor Rescher has carried on a series of investigations in value theory in an endeavor to clarify the nature of values and the ways in which they impact on human affairs. This book collects together some dozen of these studies in a way that showcases the author's characteristic perspective on this important range of basic philosophy issues. It bring clearly to view the author's characteristic combinations of analytical accuracies within a broad luminative outlook.

While philosophers from Plato to Kant and beyond have discussed the mission and methodology of philosophy, this area of deliberation has only recently been acknowledged as a distinctive branch of philosophy as such, duly entitled metaphilosophy. There are, as yet, very few books on the subject so that the present volume joins a rather select group. Professor Rescher has published in the field for some thirty years and this book gathers together a representative sampling of his contributions. Taken together (...) these pieces convey an instructive overview of the field, as well as vividly conveying their author's take on the key issues that constitute its problem domain. (shrink)

Moralists tell us to care for the interest of others. Epistemologists enjoin us to achieve consensus with others. But accommodating these “others” will be a real problem—seeing that most of them will live beyond our reach and outside our knowledge in their distant future. Philosophers do not seem to worry about distant posterity and yet cannot but acknowledge its relevancy for their concerns. This paper tries to identify and to clarify some of the many important issues that arise here.

In this autobiographical essay, the author, a widely respected philosopher, gives a vivid account of his family's struggles to find a foothold in the U.S.A. as immigrants fleeing Nazi Germany during the Hitler era. He details the course of his efforts to make a career in the academic profession, and describes his gradual evolution into one of the most prolific philosophical authors of the day.

The only extensive study that Leibniz ever made of an English-language book, his New Essays on John Locke’s 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, was based not on the English original, but on a French translation. And his correspondence with English scholars and political figures was invariably written in Latin or French. In consequence the impression is widespread among Anglophone Leibnizians that he did not know English. However, considerable evidence has come to light in recent years that Leibniz did somehow manage (...) to acquire a capacity to handle the language in its written form. (shrink)

Apart from its foray into technical issues of risk assessment and management, this book has one principal aim. With situations of chancy outcomes certain key factors—including outcome possibilities, overall expectation, threat, and even luck—are measurable parameters. But risk is something different: it is not measurable a single parametric quantity, but a many-sided factor that has several different components, and constitutes a complex phenomenon that must be assessed judgmentally in a highly contextualized way. This book explains and analyzes how this works (...) out in practice. Topics in this work include choice and risk, chance and likelihood, as well as outcome-yield evaluation and risk. It takes into account abnormal situations and eccentric measurements, situational evaluation and expectation and scrutinizes the social aspect of risk. The book is of interest to logicians, philosophers of mathematics, and researchers of risk assessment. The project is a companion piece to the author's LUCK THEORY, also published by Springer. (shrink)

It must be acknowledged that the essays presented here do not constitute a systematic account of any sort but represent occasional forays. Some deal with matters that happened to evoke Rescher's interest, others grew out of a chance encounter with a text he deemed to be of particular value. Throughout, challenges of the work itself more than compensated the author's efforts. Logic has always been of crucially important concern to philosophers. Rescher's own involvement with the history of logic (...) goes back to his work on Leibniz in the 1950's (represented by Chapter 8 of the present book). Thereafter, during the 1960's he devoted considerable effort to the contributions of the medieval logicians of the Arabic-using world (here represented in Chapters 2-6). Moreover, Rescher have from time to time returned to the area to look at some aspects of the more recent scene, as Chapters 8-9 illustrate. In some instances the present essays have been overtaken by subsequent events-events which in fact helped to promote. This is true in particular in chapter 6's work on Arabic work regarding temporal modalities, which was instrumental in evoking the important contributions of Tony Street of Cambridge University. (shrink)

Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...) organic growth. For Popper, not for inductivists or conventionalists, the successful criticism of theories is the heart of science. Popper's view admits the existence of valuable errors and enables us to avoid being wise after the event, thereby improving our understanding of the history of science through reconstructions of the actual interplay of theories and facts. (shrink)

For the first time in the German language, this book presents Nicholas Rescher's comprehensive philosophical system. It examines Rescher's contributions to a range of theoretical and practical philosophical disciplines, and discusses critical arguments. The author also explores Rescher's reflections on the systematicity of philosophy, and his links to philosophical tradition, especially Kant, Hegel, and Peirce.

Dr. Johnson famously observed that in lapidary inscriptions a man is not upon oath. This observation applies with equal force to publishers and their advertisements for books. According to the blurb, the present volume “offers essential critical material for both novice and advanced scholars of early modern philosophy.” In fact, it would be a remarkably sophisticated novice who could derive much benefit from this anthology of essays on seventeenth-century Rationalism; not merely do the authors engage with difficult issues of interpretation (...) but they often presuppose a detailed knowledge of the various positions in the exegetical debates. Nonetheless, the volume does live up to the second part of its billing: it offers a great deal for the specialist to get his or her teeth into. Despite the demands they make upon the reader, the contributions are of an almost uniformly high quality. The volume has its origins in a NEH Summer Seminar conducted by Jonathan Bennett, who himself contributes a characteristically elegant and lucid essay on Descartes’s theory of space. Bennett may take a justifiable pride in the accomplishments of the participants in his seminar. (shrink)

Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith offer a comprehensive historical and philosophical interpretation of, and commentary on, one of Plato's most widely read works, the Apology of Socrates. Virtually every modern interpretation characterizes some part of what Socrates says in the Apology as purposefully irrelevant or even antithetical to convincing the jury to acquit him at his trial. This book, by contrast, argues persuasively that Socrates offers a sincere and well-reasoned defense against the charges he faces. First, the authors establish (...) a consensus of ancient reports about Socrates ' moral and religious principles and show that these prohibit him from needlessly risking the condemnation of the jury. Second, they consider each specific claim made by Socrates in the Apology and show how each can be construed as an honest effort to inform the jurors of the truth and to convince them of his blamelessness. The arguments of this book are informed by a critical review of the scholarly literature and careful attention to the philosophy expressed in Plato's other early dialogues. (shrink)

Debate continues regarding the purpose and practice of music in relation to participation, cultural origin, and education internationally. A Darwinian approach that sees musical vocalization as the adaptive bridge between animal communication and human language remains hotly disputed where such a model does not suit the prevailing political or social agenda. The two books under review present contrasting viewpoints and evidence, while their concurrent publication illustrates the rich potential for developments in this field. Friedmann’s edited book presents separate chapters (...) by sixteen independent authors cover­ing a range of specialisms and topics. Wood’s monograph is, by contrast, an encyclopaedic exploration of the earliest writings on musical theory from China, Greece, and India and their influence on the world’s music over the last 4,000 years. Read both separately and comparatively, these two publications offer a valuable contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of music and its practice today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200 B.C.–A.D. 250Nicholas K. RauhJean-Jacques Aubert. Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200 B.C.–A.D. 250. Leiden, New York, and Köln: E. J. Brill, 1994. xvi + 520 pp. Cloth, Gld. 220, $125.75 (US). (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, Volume XXI.)Aubert’s declared purpose in this study is to examine the (...) world of Roman business managers (institores)—their social background and status, their role as managers within business enterprises, and their ensuing relations with workers, entrepreneurs, suppliers, and customers. He pursues these themes through five chapters. Chapter 1, “Business Agents and Business Managers,” explores developments in the use and meaning of the term institor through the legal, literary, papyrological, and epigraphical source materials of Republican and Imperial Rome. Chapter 2, “Indirect Agency in Roman Law,” examines the evolution of the Roman laws of indirect agency (particularly the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis) from their inception through the classical jurists to show how Roman law was adjusted to accommodate the needs of the business community. Chapter 3, “Managers of Agricultural Estates,” traces the roots of the Roman system of indirect agency to the management of agricultural estates and to the exploitation of natural resources such as clay, quarries, and manufacturing activities on the Roman farmstead. Chapter 4, “Production and Distribution of Clay Artifacts,” examines the manager’s role in the organization of various types of workshops producing clay artifacts—bricks and tiles, amphoras, terra sigillata, and terracotta lamps—and the subsequent marketing of this production. Chapter 5, “Direct Management and Public Administration: Four Case Studies,” investigates how the vilicus-based system of management became adapted to four areas of [End Page 501] the economy and administration of the Roman empire—imperial tax collection (vectigalia), recreational facilities (including baths, libraries, theaters, amphitheaters, and circuses), the imperial communications system (roads, post, and transport services), and the imperial mint. This cursory outline of A.’s intentions serves to demonstrate the breadth and importance of the task he assumes. In my opinion he handles this with a tremendous degree of authority and even-handedness.A.’s overarching theses are 1) that indirect agency emerged through the increasing absentee management of Roman farm operations and the delegation of Roman estate management to the agent known as the vilicus, 2) that regardless of the type of industry, most managerial operations exploited the practical efficiency and accountability of this vilicus-based system, and 3) that overall developments in Roman business management progressed from a more restrictive reliance on agents directly subservient to the entrepreneur (generally young slaves or family members under the direct potestas of the proprietor) to a more liberal reliance on managers enjoying looser personal connections—freedmen, servi alieni, and freeborn nonrelatives whose services were ensured by the terms of consensual contracts. One of the main points of the first chapter, for example, is the limited quantity of information there is available for institores and the generally derogatory tone it bears. We learn later on that institores were, in fact, relatively few in number and ill-liked precisely because they were so independent (175), and that far more business managers are recorded as vilici precisely because entrepreneurs could more firmly control them.A. argues that due to its extreme formalism rooted in the archaic period, Roman law lacked the concept of direct agency, and that the praetor responded to the needs of businesspeople by creating a legal system based on existing structures of Roman society (slavery and family) with advantages similar to those direct agency could otherwise have offered. With respect to the vilicus-based managerial system this was achieved through the legal fiction of the peculium, “the juristic existence of fictitious assets pertaining de facto to the dependent, but belonging de iure to the principal” (65). Terms of employment and guarantees of liability were inherently trickier for nondependent business agents and evolved during the second and first centuries b.c. through increased reliance on formulary procedure, and particularly through the development of consensual agreements. In this regard A. stresses the importance of the emergence of the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:542 BOOK REVIEWS sires. Rather, the Subjects need to want to do those things that bring about the Bosses' satisfaction. And this raises the question of the control of the imagination. explores the subtle power relations between controllers and the controlled, to the end of exploring ways that imagination offers control over power relationships. Yet Rorty ends with a bleak vision: we are a basically conservative species, whose capacities (...) for imagining new forms of power relationships tend to be dominated by the archetypes gleaned from our collective and individual experience, often reflecting malign structures. Even benign experiences, Rorty argues, tend to reinforce our inclination to seek refuge in submission to authority. What are we to make of this collection which stretches from philosophy of mind through Freudian analyses to a chastened Hobbesian vision of our social and moral order? There is much here to interest philosophers of mind and those who are concerned with the frontier between that field and empirical psychology. While she does not supply a theory of mind, Rorty shows clearly how much heterogeneous material such a theory must encompass. JOHN CHURCHILL Hendrix College Conway, Arkansas Faith and Reason From Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed Epistemology. DEWEY J. HOITENGA, JR. S.U.N.Y. Press, 1991. Pp. 263. $18.95. This is an excellent and important book. Most of those who have written about the ' Reformed ' epistemology of religious belief have done so with either polemical or systematic interests in mind. That is not inappropriate, since the interests of those who have propounded Reformed epistemology have also been mainly polemical and systematic. Though here and there they have pointed to historical antecedents, they have not traced those antecedents in any detail. Hoitenga's contribution is to do exactly that. For the most part, his understanding of Reformed epistemology is accurate. He himself crisply summarizes his understanding in these words: "Its central claim is the immediacy of our knowledge of God. We do not, in the first instance, know God by inference or testimony but by direct acquaintance with him. A closely related claim fa that we cannot easily remain indifferent to the God whom we know by such direct acquaintance. Thus our knowledge of God is like our knowl- BOOK REVIEWS 543 edge of every other fundamental kind of reality-physical objects, their properties and relationships, others persons, right and wrong, good and evil, and the elementary objects of logic and mathematics. Furthermore, the claim is that everyone knows God in this way, not just the Christian believer. If someone does not believe in God, that is, does not trust in God as Christians do, this is not because one does not know God. All human beings by nature have what Calvin calls an awareness of divinity.... Although the fall has clouded over this natural awareness of God and led to the loss of faith in him, it has not eradicated this awareness. Christian faith does not alter this direct awareness of God but rather presupposes it, rejuvenates it, and enlarges it " {235). Hoitenga discusses in detail three precursors of this view: Plato, Augustine, and Calvin, thus showing that the contemporary Reformed epistemology of religious belief stands in a long intellectual tradition. Though shortly I will offer a few critical comments about his interpretations, his discussion of the three thinkers is, in each case, extremely helpful. The full view of each of these thinkers, on the matters under consideration, must be constructed from passages scattered around in a large number of different texts. Hoitenga conducts this recovery of the relevant sources and the construction of his interpretation with wide knowledge of the primary texts, with apt use of the secondary literature, and with the judiciousness and balance which such interpretation requires. Though I shall now make critical comments on three points, I view these criticisms as entirely compatible with my judgment that Hoitenga has made a very important contribution with this historical introduction to Reformed epistemology. I begin with one point in his exposition of contemporary Reformed epistemology. Plantinga observes that there are perhaps some cases in which, though a person has a prima facie right to believe some theistic proposition immediately, that right is... (shrink)

In Part 1 of this short book, Rescher provides an overview of the nature and source of Leibniz’s interest in the theory and practice of cryptanalysis, including his unsuccessful bid to secure an apprentice for John Wallis (1616-1703) with a view to perpetuating the Englishman’s remarkable deciphering abilities. In Part 2, perhaps the most interesting part of the book, Rescher offers his account of the inner workings of Leibniz’s cipher machine. Part 3 provides a brief pictorial history of (...) such machines and related technologies. Finally, in Part 4 Rescher analyzes some of Leibniz’s own relatively scant attempts at decryption. Though there is little of direct philosophical interest in this work, its account of Leibniz’s forays into the field of encryption and in particular its reconstruction of his remarkable machine are fascinating and should hold considerable appeal for those interested in Leibniz’s pursuits more broadly and in the histories of cryptography and machine design. (shrink)

In this brief article, I review Nicholas Rescher's Paradoxes.

In a career extending over almost six decades, Nicholas Rescher has conducted researches in almost every principal area of philosophy, historical and systematic alike. In this extraordinary volume, two dozen scholars join in offering penetrating discussions of various facets of Rescher s investigations. The result is an instructively critical panorama of the many-faceted contributions of this important American philosopher. Born in Germany in 1928, Nicholas Rescher came to the U.S. at the age of nine. He (...) is University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh where he has also served as Chairman of the Philosophy Department and as director (and currently chairman) of the Center for Philosophy of Science. In a productive research career extending over six decades, he has established himself as a systematic philosopher of the old style. His work represents a many-sided approach to fundamental philosophical issues that weaves together threads of thought from continental idealism and American pragmatism. And apart from this larger program Rescher has made various specific contributions to logic (the conception autodescriptive systems of many-sided logic), the history of logic (the medieval Arabic theory of modal syllogistic), to the theory of knowledge (epistemetrics as a quantitative approach in theoretical epistemology), and to the philosophy of science (the theory of a logarithmic retardation of scientific progress). Rescher has also worked in the area of futuristics, and along with Olaf Helmer and Norman Dalkey is co-inaugurator of the so-called Delphi method of forecasting. Ten books about Rescher s philosophy have been published in four languages. Rescher earned his doctorate at Princeton in 1951 while still at the age of twenty-two a record for Princeton s Department of Philosophy. He has served as a President of the American Philosophical Association, of the American Catholic Philosophy Association, of the American G. W. Leibniz Society, of the C. S. Peirce Society, and of the American Metaphysical Society. He was the founder of the American Philosophical Quarterly. An honorary member of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, he has been elected to membership in the European Academy of Arts and Sciences (Academia Europaea), the Royal Society of Canada, the Institut International de Philosophie, and several other learned academies. Having held visiting lectureships at Oxford, Constance, Salamanca, Munich, and Marburg, he has been awarded fellowships by the Ford, Guggenheim, and National Science Foundations. Author of some hundred books ranging over many areas of philosophy, over a dozen of them translated from English into other languages, he is the recipient of eight honorary degrees from universities on three continents. He was awarded the Alexander von Humboldt Prize for Humanistic Scholarship in 1984, the Belgian Prix Mercier in 2005, and the Aquinas Medal of the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 2007.". (shrink)

PROBLEM: THE BEING OF NONEXISTENTS. In matters of irreality, medieval philosophers were not much concerned with fiction as such. The prime focus of their attention was theology, and their dealings with nonexistence related to the role of such items in relation to the thoughts of God rather than those of man. In this light, the medievals approached the issue of nonexistents on essentially the following basis.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 127 Chernyshevskii: The Man and the Journalist. By William F. Woehrlin. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 404. $12.50) Professor Woehrlin's book on Nicholas Chernyshevskii is the first full, rich, and precise treatment of that crucially important Russian intellectual in English. The narrative moves, in ten chapters, from "Boyhood in Saratov," "University Years," "The Teacher," and "The Journalist" to a consideration of its protagonist's concern (...) with "Philosophy," "Aesthetics and Literary Criticism," "Economics and Social Theory," and "Politics and the Theory of Revolution." It closes with chapters on "The Revolutionary Movement" and on "Prison and Exile." The volume contains also a bibliography, notes unfortunately relegated to the back, an index, and two photographs of Chcrnyshevskii. The book is on the whole attractively presented, although there are some misprints in the text and several misspelled names in the index. Fairness, judiciousness, care, and common sense characterize Professor Woehrlin's work. Consistently sympathetic and understanding in regard to his subject, he is nevertheless poles apart from the hackneyed hagiography of Soviet specialists. "Were Chernyshevskii's philosophical writings to be judged from the point of view of technical philosophy alone, there would be little to recommend them" (p. 140). Entirely derivative in his philosophy, the Russian radical combined Feuerbach's rejection of God and of German idealism with "the older position of materialistic monism, buttressed by the scientific popularizers of his own day" (p. 141). It was especially this latter orientation, peculiarly congenial to him, that he proceeded to preach with absolute conviction. Chernyshevskii's importance resided in the facts that on the basis of his world view he affirmed the need of revolution in Russia and that his message had a profound impact on the emerging Russian radicalism. Yet the author indicates, in a characteristicaily scrupulous and balanced examination of the sources, that Chernyshevskii as publicist also tried to influence the government in the direction of more far-reaching peasant reform and that there is no conclusive evidence that he himself took part in revolutionary activities. There is distinctly more to praise than to criticize in Professor Woehrlin's book, but the reader does wish at times that the author would develop his analysis. As man, Chernyshevskii stands clearly and sympathetically delineated; yet the author does little to resolve psychological contradictions or offer insights. In terms of ideas, Professor Woehrlin suggests that What Is To Be Done? could be approached as a parody (pp. 314 ft.). But surely more than a suggestion is needed to establish that point. And if not a parody, then what was the real nature of that strange novel and what did it mean to its author? It is when dealing with the obsessive, utopian side of Chernyshevskii that Professor Woehrlin often finds himself ill at ease. But, while one is always entitled to ask for more, one must also be grateful for what is given. Professor Woehrlin has written a very useful book and the best introduction to Chernyshevskii in any language. NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY University of California, Berkeley... (shrink)

The immeasurable impact of Pascal is rarely appreciated or understood by contemporary thinkers. On the one hand, Pascal is lauded by literary critics for his writing style while his philosophical contributions are overlooked. On the other hand, Pascal is trivialized by analytic philosophers who view his wager argument as but a poor instance of decision theory. Nicholas Reseller's book is distinctive in that it takes Pascal seriously as a philosopher in light of past and present theological modes of argumentation. (...) As a distinguished historian of pragmatic philosophy, Rescher understands Pascal to be the great innovator of the major philosophical trends of our day: the theological use of practical reason, the diversity of modes of rationality, and the focus on praxis in contemporary hermeneutics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 535 the consequent thinness and incompleteness which invest the author's discussion in this area. In fact, the omission leads Trinkaus to some misinterpretation regarding the nature and development of poetic theology and the relationships between the studia humanitatis and studia divinitatis. Thus he claims that Petrarch made the classic statement of the theologia poetica ("Poetic is not at all opposed to theology"), thereby inferring that he revived (...) this insight for the Renaissance. But this interrelationship had already been fully and substantively developed by Dante (as Colish convincingly shows in her concluding chapter). Dante's own poetic epistemology grew out of medieval poetics and was explicitly linked to Augustine's (by Dante in the Convivio). In his letter on the Divine Comedy, furthermore, Dante shows that he has appropriated for himself as poet all the tasks, methods, and powers of theology. The Divine Comedy is to be read like Scripture; its purpose is to remove men from misery and bring them to beatitude. That it can do so, moreover, derives from the fact that, as he wrote in the Convivio, "words... are like the seeds of action." Speech, e.g., prayers, poems, confessions of faith, etc., can transform the behavior of the hearer. That is why Dante called himself a poet of rectitude, and why his epitaph described him as a theologian (Theologus Dantes). Yet Trinkaus asserts that Petrarch and especially Boccaccio revived this Augustinian theory of the relationship between the prisci poetae and the prisci theologi. If Boccaccio contributed to this process (and he did), it was less because of his interest in poetic legends about the gods, than because of his admiration for Dante, the subject of his public lectures and his biography. As he declared in his Li[e o[ Dante, it is perfectly clear "that not only is poetry theology but also that theology is poetry." And were it permitted, he allowed, "I should say he [Dante] would have become a god on earth." One misses the presence of Dante in Trinkaus' book; for he belongs--as Boccaccio and Bruni, and (much later) Burcldaardt made plain--at the heart of all Renaissance discussions of poetry and theology, of epistemology, of the employment of learning to civic, public, and moral purposes, and of human and humanistic attempts to reintegrate the soul and reconcile logic to life. He, too, possessed Fanstian dimensions, and like Petrarch, he inspired the humanistic enterprise that came after. Jo~ H. GEEatmN Scripps College and Claremont Graduate School Rhetoric and Truth in France. Descartes to Diderot. By Peter France. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. viii + 282. $16.25) Can a writer express the truth without relying upon rhetorical devices? A negative answer to this question provides the recurrent theme in a "series of linked essays" in which Peter France examines classical French rhetoric as represented in the writings of Descartes, Montesquieu, d'Alembert, Bossuet, Boileau, Racine, Diderot, and Rousseau. He begins with Descartes, who is symbolic of the traditional philosophical revulsion against rhetoric, and then examines the remaining authors who fall on a spectrum between Rousseau, who engages in the "desperate quest for the mirage of genuine, unmediated communication," and Boileau, who was the self-conscious designer of a new style of rhetoric. While the focus is philosophical, the background of this book is largely historical in its illustration of the intellectual tools of a major part of French society over an extended period of time. Professor France is successful in having focus and background reinforce one another. In Part I, he begins with a description of rhetoric in the ancien r~gime. He reviews the classical and medieval roots of rhetoric; the influential Renaissance view of rhetoric as mere ornament, a view perpetuated by the work of Peter Ramus; and the role of rhetoric 536 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY in the ancien rJgime as it was taught in the schools and as a mark of social ascension. The conclusion of this review is that "all systems of verbal communication appear to contain an element of distortion." In interpreting Descartes, France relies heavily and admittedly upon the work of Goubier. One surprising comment is the assertion that Descartes refrained from publishing Le... (shrink)

Max Scheler and Siegfried Kracauer met during World War I and remained in correspondence until the early phase of the Weimar Republic. The two exchanged ideas and plans, and at times Kracauer sent his early essays for Scheler’s comments on and recommendations for publishing them. The correspondence brings to light some revealing philosophical similarities between the two authors: both Scheler and Kracauer were interested in material phenomenology, the philosophy of emotions, formal sociology; moreover, they also enthusiastically supported the German war. (...) In 1921, the conversation broke off, presumably because of the sharp criticism of Scheler’s study “Vom Ewigen im Menschen,” which Kracauer published in the Frankfurter Zeitung that same year. But even after the end of the exchange, Scheler remained an intellectual point of reference in Kracauer’s thinking. This becomes evident from the detailed reviews he wrote of Scheler’s works until the end of the Weimar period. The essay attempts to historically situate and philosophically reconstruct the correspondence between Scheler and Kracauer presented in this issue. In this way, a constellation of thought in the 1910s and 1920s becomes visible – one that that has received little attention to date. (shrink)

Ramsey famously pronounced that discounting “future enjoyments” would be ethically indefensible. Suppes enunciated an equity criterion implying that all individuals’ welfare should be treated equally. By contrast, Arrow accepted, perhaps rather reluctantly, the logical force of Koopmans’ argument that no satisfactory preference ordering on a sufficiently unrestricted domain of infinite utility streams satisfies equal treatment. In this paper, we first derive an equitable utilitarian objective based on a version of the Vickrey–Harsanyi original position, extended to allow a variable and uncertain (...) population with no finite bound. Following the work of Chichilnisky and others on sustainability, slightly weakening the conditions of Koopmans and co-authors allows intergenerational equity to be satisfied. In fact, assuming that the expected total number of individuals who ever live is finite, and that each individual’s utility is bounded both above and below, there is a coherent equitable objective based on expected total utility. Moreover, it implies the “extinction discounting rule” advocated by, inter alia, the Stern Review on climate change. (shrink)

A. Kenny, Frege, an introduction to the founder of modern analytic philosophy. London:Penguin, 1995. viii-h223pp. £7.99 T. Willamson, Vagueness. London:Routledge, 1994. xiii-f-325 pp. £35.00 TOM BU...